OPCON Transfer to South Korea and Reevaluating U.S. Military Presence

Although this post is the result of some very preliminary investigation, the South Korea part of the topic looks to be a little bit tricky. There has already been a scheduled major reformulation of the U.S. military role in S. Korea. This reformulation will either make Affs strategic because they will benefit from a strong claim that many of the negative's disadvantages are non-unique, or, it will make it tough to find defensible, topical action that doesn't go too far beyond the direction of the status quo.

Currently, the U.S. has wartime Operational Control of South Korean military forces. This arrangement is part of the legacy of the Korean War (1950-1953). Peacetime control of South Korean military forces was returned to South Korea in 1994. Now, the U.S. and South Korea plan to transfer wartime OPCON (Operational Control) of South Korean troops to S. Korea in 2012. The agreement for transfer of this authority was seen to be mutually beneficial for the U.S. and South Korea because it was thought it would enable a realignment of U.S. forces for more strategic flexibility. Rather than being bound to S. Korea, U.S. forces could be recomprised as Rapid Deployment Force that would be authorized and capable of responding to a myriad of threats in the region. At the time the OPCON transfer was agreed upon, South Korean leadership supported the move because it was seen as a restoration of South Korean sovereignty. Some voices in South Korea, though, have expressed concern that 2012 is too soon and might leave South Korea vulnerable to a threat from North Korea. There has been some significant grumbling in South Korea, with calls to slow the process down. But, to date, the U.S. has indicated that OPCON transfer is still on track to happen by 2012.

The likely question debates about S. Korea on this topic will revolve around will be how much reduction in U.S. military presence is too much? Would a reduction in forces seem like a total abandonment of security commitments to South Korea, when the peninsula is still adjusting to the proposed OPCON transfer? Or, has a reduction in U.S. presence already been accounted for by South (and North) Korea and will, in actuality, be of little diplomatic consequence.

Affirmatives may try to claim that OPCON transfer is only a first step toward the establishment of a Rapid Deployment Force and that a true draw down in forces is necessary to solidify a change in the role of troops currently in South Korea. From there, they may attempt to claim an array of advantages based on an effective regional RDF. These advantages will be torn from the pages of the Quadrennial Defense Review and its outline of the emerging U.S. security concerns.

For more information, check out the following:

"Seoul seeks extended U.S. protection." February 4, 2010. Lee Jong-Heon. UPI Asia.
http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2010/02/04/seoul_seeks_extended_us_protection/2951/

"Taking Defense Into Our Own Hands." February 12, 2010. Joong Ang Daily.
http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2916530

"It's not the right time to discuss OPCON transfer." June, 22, 2009. Bruce Klingner. Heritage Foundation.
http://www.heritage.org/press/commentary/ed062209c.cfm

"Upgrading the South Korea-U.S. Alliance." March 4, 2009. Lee Jae Young. UPI Asia
http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2009/03/04/upgrading_the_south_korea-us_alliance/3491/