(Pope JP2, MJ, Magnum PI courtesy of Madam Tussaud's Wax Museum)
Claire McKinney -
So in 2010, debaters are returning to consideration of America’s place in the world. And, for the first time in many years, the focus is on the United States’ military posture vis a vis the world. The first critical argument on everyone’s mind will of course be the Security Kritik. And every aff’s first response will be to grab 4 or 5 realism cards.
What affirmatives think they accomplish when answering the security kritik with realism is that they have explained the world in such a way to make the kritik untrue and the alternative impossible. Realism begins with the assumption that world is material; the way we speak about the world has no effect on how the world functions because of two “facts”: 1) Actors in the world have an immutable nature (rational and motivated by fear) and 2) Actors act in predictable ways based on their material capabilities. Because humans, and thus human creations, states, are inherently rational and motivated primarily by fear, then there is no use criticizing what cannot be changed based on this worldview. Thus, the only option is to cope with the world as it is rather than trying to transform it. States will always try and secure their interests through the threat of force because they fear their own death (state death, in the realist literature, is either a complete loss of sovereignty or a loss of territorial integrity. Thus, Germany from 1945-1989 is an example of state death, as is Czechoslovakia 1936-1945.). What this allows the affirmative to do is challenge several premises of the kritik: 1) The world is socially constructed 2) The idea of security produces proliferating insecurity, which requires the ever-escalating use of force 3) If we think about the world differently, we can change the cycle of state violence.
The problem with using realism in this way is that it artificially constrains the type of affirmatives you can advocate and the other types of offense you could generate against the kritik. Because realism is a systematized way of seeing the world, you cannot proffer other contrary ways of seeing the world alongside it. This does not mean that teams are not successful reading mutually contradictory evidence (such as reading a Soft Power advantage which assumes ideas are critical in balance of power alongside realism, which argues that ideas are mostly irrelevant.). What it means is that those teams will be outfoxed by negatives that know more about realism than they do. Basically, reading realism gives the negative an advantage because if they can prove the aff is not realist, then those cards become wasted 2AC time.
Using realism to answer the Security Kritik (and every other kritik, whether it applies or not) is a relic from a different era in debate when impact-turning the kritik was an ascendant strategy. Now, as the perm becomes more important as a tool, realism should have lost its sheen. Yet it hasn’t, which is puzzling as a debate strategy. But the move to realism is even more puzzling given this year’s topic; realism may actually put the aff at a disadvantage. Why?
1) If the World is realist, we don’t need the Aff.
2) Most affirmatives on this topic are most likely not realist (or at least, not offensively realist).
3) Realism hamstrings your ability to make better permutation arguments persuasively.
4) There are better, truer theories of international relations that will put the aff at a competitive advantage.
1) If the World is realist, we don’t need the affirmative. You might find this to be a silly argument, but it is actually one of the persistent charges about realism in the academic world. Realism purports to be a descriptive theory about how the world works, but realist theorists find it necessary to make normative policy suggestions.
Affirmatives on this topic are most likely not realist. Why? Well, because this year’s topic, in terms of hegemony, will most likely rely on some form of alliance argument to argue why a withdrawal of troops and bases will not destroy United States Hegemony. Let’s take Meersheimer as an example. . John Meersheimer’s realism has the following 5 assumptions:
1) The international sphere is anarchic (no international law).
2) States are unitary actors (no domestic politics govern state international relations)
3) States are rational (they act in their own self-interest)
4) States have offensive military capabilities
5) States are uncertain of other states’ intentions.
If these assumptions are true, then there is no reason to say that a state needs to change their current Grand Strategy. They cannot change the structure of the international realm and are already acting rationally within it. Why do we need normative suggestions if states are already acting rationally? To argue that the current United States Grand strategy is irrational (eg will cause nuclear war) violates the assumptions of realism, and therefore means that our theory of the world is wrong.
2) Most affirmatives on this topic are most likely not realist (or at least, not offensively realist).
I can imagine two opitions for most affs, one non-realism and one realist.
Option 1: Security Alliances
Japan, Iraq, and Afghanistan all have obvious alliance advantages: Japanese-American Security Alliance (JASA) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are both implicated by United States Grand Strategy. Some articles suggest that JASA is under stress by domestic Japanese opposition to US bases in Japan and NATO has recently taken command of almost all US forces in Afghanistan. Thus, it is highly possible many affs will claim to revitalize these organizations specifically or multilateralism more generally. If this is the case, THE AFF ISN’T REALIST.
Realism undermines the idea that alliances can be at all useful or binding on states because of its assumptions about state action. Realist theories of international relations rely on several assumptions of state action
The aff’s impact claims of alliances being good violate the first, third, and fifth assumptions because they presume that the alliance structure has some exogenous effect on state interaction that constitutes some sort of law, binding states in obligation to one another. The United States, as a hegemon, actually has very little interest in maintaining any alliance structure if it diminishes its unitary hegemonic power. This security institutionalism is more closely allied with a school of thought called Liberal Institutionalism than with Structural Realism. Structural realists would argue that cooperation is the function of the balance of power and that institutions such as alliances are neutral in their effect on cooperation. There is no incentive for a state not to cheat their institution if realism is true.
Now you might say my aff is JASA Bad, or NATO bad or Afghanistan Instability Good! Of course, if your affirmative shares the assumptions of realism, you should not feel compelled to abandon realist theoretical assumptions or justifications. However, if your aff is JASA good, NATO good, unilateralism bad, etc., then you have a theoretical and a strategic problem on your hands.
Option 2: Off Shore Balancing
Kuwait, Turkey, and South Korea affs all have less to do with existing security institutions and have more to do with transforming the United States’ Grand Strategy from Power Projection to Off-Shore Balancing. Off-shore balancing is a strategy that relies on allies to constrain rising states regionally as opposed to maintaining bases oneself globally. This is a move within realist thought, and thus is the time when using realism to answer the security kritik makes sense theoretically, although perhaps not strategically.
Those are the theoretical issues with Realism, but there are strategic issues as well. Part II will consider those strategic issues.
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